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Abstract—Though voting-based consensus algorithms in
Blockchain outperform proof-based ones in energy- and
transaction-efficiency, they are prone to incur wrong elections and
bribery elections. The former originates from the uncertainties
of candidates’ capability and availability; and the latter comes
from the egoism of voters and candidates. Hence, in this paper,
we propose an uncertainty- and collusion-proof voting consensus
mechanism, including the selection pressure-based voting con-
sensus algorithm and the trustworthiness evaluation algorithm.
The first algorithm can decrease the side effects of candidates’
uncertainties, lowering wrong elections while trading off the
balance between efficiency and fairness in electing miners. The
second algorithm adopts an incentive compatible scoring rule to
evaluate the trustworthiness of voting, motivating voters to report
true beliefs on candidates by making egoism in consistent with
altruism so as to avoid bribery elections. A salient feature of our
work is theoretically analyzing the proposed voting consensus
mechanism by the large deviation theory. Our analysis provides
not only the voting failure rate of a candidate but also its decay
speed, based on which the concepts of the effective selection valve
and the effective expectation of merit are introduced to help the
system designer to determine the optimal voting standard and
guide a candidate to behave in an optimal way for lowering the
voting failure rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Featured with decentralization, transparency, immutability
and global inclusiveness, Blockchain is breeding extensive
novel applications and fields, pulling us from Internet of
information to Internet of value. So far, the market size of
Blockchain is around USD 1,907.8 million, which is estimated
to reach USD 7,684 million by 2022, at a compound annual
growth rate of 79.6% [1]. Essentially, Blockchain is an event1-
driven deterministic state machine, which calls for consensus
algorithms to agree on the order of deterministic events and
screen out invalid events. The mainstream consensus algo-
rithms in Blockchain are proof of work (PoW) [2] and proof
of stake (PoS) [3].
PoW allocates the accounting rights and rewards through the
competition among nodes to solve cryptographic puzzles in the
form of a hash computation by brute-forcing. PoW obviously
incurs a serious low-efficiency issue due to the immense scale
1 When Blockchain is applied in the financial sector, the transaction is a
typical event.
of electricity wasting and long transaction confirmation delay.
Yet, such a way of sacrificing efficiency does not bring fairness
even though it is the original design intention of PoW. This is
because mining one block is so hard that extensive individual
miners tend to gather their hashing powers to form mining
pools for seeking the solution of PoW puzzles together. Thus,
the accounting rights and rewards are gradually concentrated
in several super mining pools, leading a solo miner hardly
has the opportunity to participate in the decision-making of
Blockchain. This unfairness makes complete decentralization
cannot be realized through PoW.
As a power-saving alternative to PoW, PoS introduces a
concept of the coin age, which is the value of the coin
multiplied by the time period after the coin was created.
PoS sets the difficulty of mining to be inversely proportional
to the coin age. Thus, the consensus in Blockchain is no
longer completely relying on the proof of work, effectively
addressing the problem of electricity wasting. However, PoS
still has a limitation in improving efficiency since it does not
significantly lower the transaction confirmation delay. Not only
that, PoS leads to more unfairness in that the rich miners are
bound to be dominant in the Blockchain network.
Different from PoW and PoS where all nodes participate in
the decision making of Blockchain, delegated PoS (DPoS) [4]
leverages the voting power of stakeholders to select qualified
nodes to mine, who will receive rewards when creating cor-
rect and timely blocks. Since no competition among miners
in mathematical computations, DPoS outperforms PoW and
PoS in energy- and transaction-efficiency. However, DPoS
suffers two issues: 1) wrong election. Due to the information
asymmetry, a voter is hardly fully aware of a candidate’s
behavior. When the candidate mines precariously or behaves
maliciously, he2 will be voted out at the end of one round.
However, such an ex-post countermeasure cannot compensate
for the loss of the voters caused by their wrong selection in
this round; 2) bribery election. Though the voting mechanism
seems democratic, it can easily ruin fairness in practice since
voters are also stakeholders, which makes room for the voters
2In this paper, we use “he” and “she” to differentiate the candidate and the
voter.
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and candidates to collude, leading to bribery election.
In this paper, we propose an uncertainty- and collusion-
proof voting consensus mechanism, which inherits the advan-
tages of DPoS in terms of energy- and transaction-efficiency,
but has no trouble in wrong and bribery elections. It is chal-
lenging to realize the proposed voting consensus mechanism in
that 1) the uncertainty leading to wrong elections is dual: one
from unknown candidates and the other from familiar ones. In
detail, lacking knowledge on the mining ability of unknown
candidates, a voter may miss professional miners or mistakenly
vote incompetent candidates as qualified ones. Even, the voter
may still make wrong decisions when facing candidates who
had been selected before due to their uncertain behaviors, such
as becoming unavailable because of electricity shortage or
malicious attacks; 2) the real intention of voting (egoism or
altruism) is the private information of a voter, which makes it
easy to hide collusion between voters and candidates, implying
that bribery elections are prone to take place.
To tackle the first challenge, we propose a selection
pressure-based voting consensus algorithm. In ecology, the
selection pressure is used to characterize the advantage that
a creature’s traits are chosen to survive. We introduce this
concept in the proposed voting consensus algorithm to de-
pict the urgency of a candidate being chosen. The selection
pressure is designed to elect miners with high availability and
less frequency of being chosen before. Such a design has two
merits: 1) it can not only reduce side effects from uncertain
behaviors of known candidates but also explore unfamiliar
or even completely unknown candidates, decreasing wrong
elections due to the low cognitive level of global information;
2) it can trade off the balance between efficiency and fairness
in electing miners.
To address the second challenge, we adopt a scoring rule for
evaluating the trustworthiness of voting. Such a rule subjects
to the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, so that a rational
and intelligent voter finds she can obtain a higher score when
telling the truth rather than lying. Thus, the motivation of
collusion between the voter and the candidate is naturally
eliminated, implying that bribery elections can be prevented.
An attractive nature of the trustworthiness evaluation algorithm
is that there is no need to submit any private information.
Instead, a voter only needs to report her opinion of any other
random peer voter’s prior and posterior beliefs on candidates.
The reason behind such a design is each voter’s subjective
belief comes from the same Blockchain system, which affects
every voter in the same way. Hence, the subjective belief of
any voter is symmetric with regard to that of any other voter.
A salient feature of our work is theoretically analyzing the
proposed voting consensus mechanism by taking advantage of
the large deviation theory. The main contributions and results
of this part are summarized as follows:
• We provide not only the voting failure rate of a candidate
but also its decay speed. Such a fine-grained analysis
reveals that to slow down the growth rate of the voting
failure rate, lowering the selection criteria is more effec-
tive than increasing the selection pressure of a candidate.
• A concept of the effective selection valve is introduced to
describe the lowest selection criteria that can guarantee
the voting failure rate of a candidate no more than a given
tolerance degree. Through solving the effective selection
valve, the optimal number of super nodes (i.e., the
winners in the voting) can be determined for the system
designer to meet the requirement of the voting failure
rate, essentially ensuring the fairness of the Blockchain
system.
• A concept of the effective expectation of merit is in-
troduced as the minimum expected merit a candidate
brought to the voter, which makes his voting failure rate
no more than a given tolerance degree. The value of this
metric quantitatively answers a question: how much effort
should a candidate devote to become a super node?
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows: In
Section II, we present an overview of our proposed voting
consensus mechanism. The main part of the mechanism,
named selection pressure-based voting consensus algorithm, is
elaborated in Section III, which is further enhanced with the
voting trustworthiness evaluation in Section IV. We conduct
an experimental evaluation in Section V to illustrate the
effectiveness of our mechanism, and summarize the most
related work in Section VI. The whole paper is concluded
in Section VII.
II. OVERVIEW OF OUR VOTING CONSENSUS MECHANISM
In this section, an overview of our proposed uncertainty- and
collusion-proof voting consensus mechanism is introduced,
where N voters are required select K super nodes from M
candidates as representatives to mine. Since a node obtains the
accounting right through the voting rather than the competition
with other nodes in terms of computing power, the proposed
mechanism inherits the advantage of DPoS in saving energy
and speeding up transactions. However, such a voting-based
consensus mechanism may suffer the issues of wrong and
bribery elections as mentioned in Section I, pressing a need
to find solutions.
To avoid bribery and wrong elections, we employ score to
evaluate the capability of any candidate to be a super node.
K nodes with the highest scores are selected as super nodes.
The score Skj of any candidate j in the k
th round of voting
can be calculated as
Skj =
N∑
i=1
si × tkij × ckij , j = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (1)
In (1), ckij ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator identifying whether
voter i chooses candidate j as a super node in round k,
satisfying
∑M
j=1 c
k
ij ≤ K, which is a key parameter needed
to be controlled strategically to refrain from wrong selection.
tkij represents the trustworthiness of votes that voter i casts
to j in round k, reflecting the degree that voter i chooses
candidate j in light of his block mining capability rather than
other factors, which is designed to avoid bribery election. The
larger the value of tkij is, the more reliable i chooses j, leading
to his high score. Finally, si is the stake of voter i, indicating
her voting weight or speaking power in voting process.
In the proposed uncertainty- and collusion-proof voting
consensus mechanism, as shown in Fig. 1, to reduce wrong
selections, we propose the selection pressure-based voting
consensus algorithm to determine the optimal ckij (i =
1, 2, · · · , N ; j = 1, 2, · · · ,M ), combined with which, the
voting trustworthiness tkij can be calculated through the evalu-
ation algorithm to hold back bribery elections. We will detail
the above two algorithms in the following sections.
Fig. 1: Overview of the proposed voting consensus mecha-
nism.
III. SELECTION PRESSURE-BASED VOTING CONSENSUS
ALGORITHM AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we will introduce the proposed selection
pressure-based voting consensus algorithm and then take ad-
vantage of the large deviation theory [5] to analyze it.
A. Selection Pressure-Based Voting Consensus Algorithm
In the proposed selection pressure-based voting consensus
algorithm, the selection pressure F tij of each candidate j (j =
1, 2, · · · ,M ) in the tth round of voting is formulated as follow
F tij = M
t−1
ij − Ct−1ij , t = 2, 3, · · · (2)
In (2), M t−1ij = m
1
ij + m
2
ij + · · · + mt−1ij and Ct−1ij = c1ij +
c2ij + · · · + ct−1ij , where mkij ≥ 0 is the merit of candidate j
to voter i in round k (k = 1, 2, · · · , t − 1) and ckij ∈ {0, 1}
is whether candidate j is selected by voter i in round k as
mentioned above.
The proposed voting consensus algorithm elects the top K
nodes with the biggest F tij for voter i to determine c
t
ij , which
can trade off the balance between efficiency and fairness in
electing super nodes. In detail, the bigger F tij implies the
higher M t−1ij and the lower C
t−1
ij . The greater the merit M
t−1
ij
of candidate j, the more the contribution he had made to voter
i until round t−1. Selecting candidates with the higher M t−1ij
can improve the profit of voter i in the future. In addition, the
lower Ct−1ij means the fewer historical selections are made on
j. Electing candidates with the lower Ct−1ij can reflect the fair-
ness of the voter in the voting process, which also facilitates
exploring unfamiliar or completely unknown candidates. Thus,
through trying to have a more comprehensive understanding
of the overall information about candidates, voters can make
rational and intelligent elections.
In the following, we will detail how to calculate mkij (i =
1, 2, · · · , N ; j = 1, 2, · · · ,M ; k = 1, 2, · · · ) in (2). Since
mkij means the merit of candidate j to voter i in round k, it
is affected by two factors: the availability of candidate j and
the profit he brought to voter i in round k, indicated by Rkij .
Obviously, a candidate with high historical contribution and
low unavailability is more valuable to a voter. Hence, mkij can
be calculated as
mkij = ρd(uj) +R
k
ij . (3)
In (3), ρ is a scaling parameter. d(uj) is a function indicating
the availability of candidate j, where uj ∈ [0, 1] is the
unavailable probability of candidate j. The larger uj , the
smaller d(uj). In practice, uj can be estimated by the total
number of unavailable times divided by the total number of
times that candidate j being elected. Obviously, the method
using the availability of a candidate as an important metric for
evaluating his merit can effectively reduce the negative impact
of the candidate’s uncertain behaviors on voting, lowering the
probability of wrong election.
B. Analysis Based on the Large Deviation Theory
In this subsection, we take advantage of the large deviation
theory to analyze the performance of the proposed voting
consensus algorithm. To that aim, we create a virtual queue
Qtij (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ; j = 1, 2, · · · ,M ) as follows,
Qtij = C
t−1
ij −M t−1ij , t = 2, 3, · · · . (4)
It is easy to find that Qtij = −F tij , implying that the larger
F tij , the smaller Q
t
ij . Since the proposed voting consensus
algorithm elects the top K nodes with the biggest F tij , Q
t
ij
actually characterizes the ranking of candidate j for being
elected. A candidate with a large F tij has a high urgency to be
elected, thus he ranks high, implying he has short virtual queue
length. Hence, we name the virtual queue Qtij the ranking
queue. A node with short length of ranking queue has high
chance to be elected.
Since any candidate j being elected in each round subjects
to the Binomial distribution, Ct−1ij can be assumed as a Possion
process. Similarly, the merit of candidate j to voter i in each
round depends on whether he is elected, which is an event
obeying the Binomial distribution as just mentioned, implying
that M t−1ij can also be viewed as a Possion process. We assume
that λ and Λ are respectively the expectations of M t−1ij and
Ct−1ij . To guarantee the stability of the virtual queue Q
t
ij , λ >
Λ should hold, and thus ρ in (3) should satisfy ρ > Λ(1−R)d(uj) ,
where R is the maximum of Rtij .
For any candidate, his main concern is under what con-
ditions will he fail in the election. This is also the key in
analyzing a voting consensus algorithm. To that aim, we study
the metric Lij = supt≥2Q
t
ij , which is the longest ranking
queue length of candidate j when t → ∞, reflecting his
historic lowest selection pressure. Considering each voter can
select up to K super nodes in our proposed voting consensus
algorithm, we have the following definition:
Definition III.1 (Selection valve). The selection valve L is the
ranking queue length of a candidate whose selection pressure
is ranked Kth.
Obviously, when Lij > L, candidate j may fail in the
election. Otherwise, he will be elected by voter i. To analyze
such an event, we define the following concept:
Definition III.2 (Voting failure rate). The voting failure rate
indicates the probability that any candidate j is not elected by
voter i when his historic longest ranking queue Lij is longer
than the selection valve L, i.e., P (Lij > L).
In the following, we will analyze the distribution of
P (Lij > L). Let L = lb for b > 0. In light of the Cramer’s
theorem [5], when l→∞, we have
lim
l→∞
1
l
logP (Lij > lb) = −I(b), (5)
with
I(b) = inf
t≥2
tψ∗(
b
t
), (6)
where
ψ∗(x) = sup
θ∈R
{θx− ψ(θ)} . (7)
In (7), ψ∗(x) is the convex conjugate or the Legendre trans-
formation of ψ(θ) which is the cumulant generating function
of Qtij and can be expressed as
ψ(θ) = lim
t→∞
1
t
log E
[
eθ(Q
t
ij)
]
= lim
t→∞
1
t
log E
[
eθ(C
t−1
ij −Mt−1ij )
]
= lim
t→∞
1
t
log E[eθC
t−1
ij ]E[e−θM
t−1
ij ]
= lim
t→∞
1
t
log E[eθC
t−1
ij ] + lim
t→∞
1
t
log E[e−θM
t−1
ij ]
= ψCt−1ij
(θ) + ψMt−1ij
(−θ).
In the above equation, ψCt−1ij (·) and ψMt−1ij (·) are respec-
tively the cumulant generating functions of Ct−1ij and M
t−1
ij .
Because the cumulant generating function for any Poisson
process X can be calculated as log E[eθX ] = EX(eθ − 1),
we have
ψCt−1ij
(θ) = Λ(eθ − 1), (8)
and
ψMt−1ij
(θ) = λ(eθ − 1). (9)
Thus, (7) can be transferred to
ψ∗(x) = sup
θ∈R
{
θx− Λ(eθ − 1)− λ(e−θ − 1)} . (10)
In the following, we will discuss how to solve (10) so as
to obtain I(b) in (5). In fact, we only need to consider the
case of x > 0 in (10) because of bt > 0. Let G(θ) = θx −
Λ(eθ − 1) − λ(e−θ − 1). For ∂2G(θ)∂θ2 = −Λeθ − λe−θ < 0,
θ∗ that maximizes G(θ) can be calculated with the condition
∂G(θ)
∂θ = 0. So,
θ∗ = log
x+
√
x2 + 4λΛ
2Λ
. (11)
Hence, we have
ψ∗(x) =x log
x+
√
x2 + 4λΛ
2Λ
− x+
√
x2 + 4λΛ
2
− 2Λλ
x+
√
x2 + 4Λλ
+ λ+ Λ. (12)
Let x = b/t in (12), we can obtain inft≥2 tψ∗( bt ) at t =
b/(λ− Λ).
Thus, we have
I(b) = b log
λ
Λ
. (13)
I(b) is the rate function of P (Lij > L) which slumps
exponentially with the selection valve L. Hence, I(b) indicates
the decay speed of the voting failure rate. The larger I(b) is,
the slower the growth rate of the voting failure rate. Otherwise,
the growth rate of the voting failure rate will leap, suggesting
that candidate j should improve his availability as much as
possible to increase his selection pressure so as to shorten Lij
for decreasing P (Lij > L).
Fig. 2 illustrates the impacts of b and λ − Λ on I(b), i.e.,
the decay rate of the voting failure rate. It can be found that
I(b) increases as either b or λ− Λ goes up. Considering that
L = lb and λ − Λ is the expectation of F tij , we can draw
the first conclusion: no matter lifting the selection valve L or
enhancing the selection pressure of a candidate, the growth
rate of his voting failure rate can fall off. Furthermore, it
can be found that the decay rate I(b) increases linearly with
b while creeps up logarithmically with λ − Λ. Hence, our
second conclusion is the change of the voting failure rate is
more sensitive to the selection valve rather than the selection
pressure. Hence, to reduce the voting failure rate, the most
effective way is to lift the selection valve so as to increase
the vacancies of super nodes. However, more super nodes’
mining in the system incurs more cost. Therefore, it is worth
to study how to determine a proper selection valve to trade
off the balance of the voting failure rate and the mining cost.
To that aim, we introduce the following concept:
Definition III.3 (Effective selection valve). The effective se-
lection valve L∗() is the minimum selection valve that makes
the voting failure rate of a candidate j no more than a given
threshold  ∈ (0, 1], which is called the voting failure tolerance
degree. That is
L∗() = min {L : P (Lij > L) ≤ }.
Facing any candidate j whose expected merit to voter i
and expected number of times being elected by voter i are
respectively λ and Λ, meaning that his expected selection
pressure is λ− Λ, the effective selection valve of voter i can
be calculated by taking advantage of the following theorem:
Theorem III.1. L∗() = − log / log λΛ , given λ > Λ > 0
and  ∈ (0, 1].
Proof. We have logP (Lij > L) ∼ −lI(b) when l → ∞. In
light of P (Lij > L) ≤ , we have I(b) ≥ − log l . Combined
with I(b) = b log λΛ , we can derive the value of L
∗().
Fig. 3 illustrates that the effective selection valve L∗() de-
creases logarithmically with the increase of the voting failure
tolerance degree , implying that the reduced voting failure
rate requirement makes voter i have more vacancies of super
nodes. When  is fixed, as the expectation of the selection
pressure λ−Λ rises up, L∗() decreases logarithmically, which
also can make sure there are enough qualified candidates
to be super nodes. The selection valve L is defined as the
ranking queue length of a candidate whose selection pressure
is ranked Kth, where K is the number of super nodes that
voters should elect. Therefore, there exists an optimal value
of K, namely K∗() corresponding to L∗(), which can be
actually used to guarantee the voting failure rate of a candidate
is not higher than the voting failure tolerance degree. So K∗()
is a valuable parameter for the voting consensus algorithm
designer to guarantee the requirement of the voting failure
rate of candidates, essentially ensuring the fairness of the
Blockchain system.
However, when K is fixed, i.e., the vacancies of super nodes
cannot be changed, a direct way for candidate j to reduce
his voting failure rate is to improve his competitiveness, i.e.,
the expectation of his merit λ. So we introduce the following
definition:
Definition III.4 (Effective expectation of merit). The effective
expectation of merit λ∗() is the minimum merit expectation
of a candidate that makes his voting failure rate no more than
the voting failure tolerance degree  ∈ (0, 1]. That is,
λ∗() = min {λ : P (Lij > L) ≤ }.
Taking advantage of the similar method, we can prove the
following theorem:
Theorem III.2. Given Λ > 0 and  ∈ (0, 1],
λ∗() = Λe−
log 
L .
Fig. 4 shows given the fixed Λ, the increase of either the
voting failure tolerance degree  or the selection valve L will
lead to the drop of the effective expectation of merit λ∗(),
which will remain stable after declining to a certain level.
The reason behind this fact is that the merit of a candidate
includes two parts: his availability and his profit brought to
the voter. Even if the availability can be reduced responding
to the reduced requirement () and the increased vacancies of
super nodes (L), the profit that the candidate can bring to the
voter cannot be decreased due to his fixed expectation number
of times being elected (i.e., Λ). Thus, the effective expectation
of merit λ∗() will not reduce to zero but stabilize to the
expectation of profit brought to the voter.
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Fig. 2: Decay rate of the voting failure rate.
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Fig. 3: Effective selection valve.
IV. OUR VOTING CONSENSUS FRAMEWORK WITH VOTING
TRUSTWORTHINESS EVALUATION
In this paper, we employ the idea of the private-prior peer
prediction [6] [7] to evaluate the trustworthiness of votes that
voter i casts to any candidate j so as to determine tkij (i =
1, 2, · · · , N ; j = 1, 2, · · · ,M ; k = 1, 2, ...) in (1). Our voting
consensus framework with trustworthiness evaluation is shown
in Fig. 5, which is detailed in the following.
In the beginning of round k, any voter i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N)
is required to broadcast her prior belief yirj(k) ∈ [0, 1] about
how likely her random peer voter r (r = 1, 2, · · · , i −
1, i+ 1, · · · , N) will vote for candidate j (j = 1, 2, · · · ,M).
At the same time, voter i will also receive the prior belief
yiˆrj(k) ∈ [0, 1] from all other nodes in the Blockchain system,
where iˆ 6= i is also a voter. When k = 1, voters have to
exchange the estimation of prior beliefs on selections without
any prior knowledge. When k > 1, the prior belief yirj(k) can
be calculated as:
yirj(k) = P ( ˆcrj = 1|cˆij = 1)P (ckij = 1)
+P ( ˆcrj = 1|cˆij = 0)P (ckij = 0).
(14)
In (14), P (ckij = 1) and P (c
k
ij = 0) are respectively the
probabilities that voter i considers herself may select or not
select candidate j in round k, which can be obtained from
her subjective prior belief on selecting this candidate. cˆij ( ˆcrj)
indicates whether voter i (r) picks candidate j in the long term.
Hence, P ( ˆcrj = 1|cˆij = 1) and P ( ˆcrj = 1|cˆij = 0) are the
conditional probabilities that voter r selects candidate j when
voter i makes the same and different decisions respectively,
both of which can be calculated according to the historic
results of previous k − 1 rounds. In detail, when k > 1, we
have P ( ˆcrj = 1|cˆij = 1) = P ( ˆcrj=1,cˆij=1)P (cˆij=1) =
∑k−1
v=1 c
v
rj ·
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Fig. 4: Effective expectation of merit with Λ = 0.5.
Fig. 5: Our voting consensus framework with trustworthiness
evaluation.
cvij/
∑k−1
v=1 c
v
ij , and P ( ˆcrj = 1|cˆij = 0) = P ( ˆcrj=1,cˆij=0)P (cˆij=0) =∑k−1
v=1 c
v
rj · (1− cvij)/
∑k−1
v=1(1− cvij).
Then, each voter i updates: a) the unavailable times of each
candidate j before round k, so as to deduce his unavailable
probability uj ; b) the selection times Ck−1ij of candidate j
before k, based on which the profit Rk−1ij that candidate j
devoted to voter i can be obtained; employing the above
information, the selection pressure F kij of each candidate j
in round k can be calculated according to (2), so that the
voting choice ckij (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ; j = 1, 2, · · · ,M ) can be
obtained through the proposed selection pressure-based voting
consensus algorithm.
After updating and calculating the above key parameters,
the cognition of voter i on each candidate iterates, which
makes voter i have the posterior belief yirj
′
(k) ∈ [0, 1]
about the possibility that the random peer voter r (r =
1, 2, · · · , i − 1, i + 1, · · · , N) will vote for any candidate j
(j = 1, 2, · · · ,M). Then, voter i will notify his choice ckij
as well as the posterior belief yirj
′
(k) to all other nodes, and
receive these two parameters from each of them.
We use Vj ∈ {h, l} to indicate the mining capability of
candidate j. If candidate j is qualified enough to be elected as
a super node, Vj = h, and otherwise Vj = l. Let ekj ∈ {0, 1}
represent whether candidate j is elected as a super node in
round k. Since the proposed voting consensus framework can
guarantee the voting results are credible, P (Vj = h) can
be estimated by
∑k−1
v=1 e
v
j
k−1 before the super nodes are elected
in round k. Obviously, P (Vj = l) =
∑k−1
v=1(1−evj )
k−1 in this
case. Thus, the posterior belief yirj
′
(k) when k > 1 can be
calculated as3
yirj
′
(k) =

P ( ˆcrj = 1|Vj = h)P (ekj = 1|ckij = 1)
+P ( ˆcrj = 1|Vj = l)P (ekj = 0|ckij = 1), ckij = 1
P ( ˆcrj = 1|Vj = h)P (ekj = 1|ckij = 0)
+P ( ˆcrj = 1|Vj = l)P (ekj = 0|ckij = 0), ckij = 0
where P ( ˆcrj = 1|Vj = h) = P ( ˆcrj=1,Vj=h)P (Vj=h) =
∑k−1
v=1 c
v
rj ·
evj/
∑k−1
v=1 e
v
j and P ( ˆcrj = 1|Vj = l) = P ( ˆcrj=1,Vj=l)P (Vj=l) =∑k−1
v=1 c
v
rj ·(1−evj )/[(k−1)−
∑k−1
v=1 e
v
j ]. P (e
k
j = 1|ckij = 1) and
P (ekj = 0|ckij = 1) (P (ekj = 1|ckij = 0) and P (ekj = 0|ckij =
0)) respectively represent the probabilities that candidate j
will be elected or not in round k when voter i picks (does
not choose) candidate j in this round. Because in this stage,
whether candidate j is finally elected as a super node is not
determined yet, P (ekj = 1|ckij = 1) and P (ekj = 0|ckij = 1)
(P (ekj = 1|ckij = 0) and P (ekj = 0|ckij = 0)) need to
be predicted by voter i, thus reflecting her real thoughts on
whether candidate j is qualified enough to be elected.
Based on the prior and posterior beliefs, i.e., yirj(k) and
yirj
′
(k), as well as the voting choice ckrj received, the trustwor-
thiness tkij of voter i’s choice c
k
ij in round k can be calculated
according to the following scoring rule [?]:
tkij =
[
αW
(
yirj(k), c
k
rj
)
+ (1− α)W
(
yirj
′
(k), ckrj
)
+ β
]
.
(15)
In (15), α ∈ [0, 1] is a scaling parameter, and W can be the
logarithmic form, namely,{
W (y, c = 1) = ln(y),
W (y, c = 0) = ln(1− y), (16)
or the quadratic form, i.e.,{
W (y, c = 1) = 2y − y2,
W (y, c = 0) = 1− y2. (17)
And
β = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
[
αW
(
yirj(k), c
k
rj
)
+ (1− α)W
(
yirj
′
(k), ckrj
)]
.
(18)
According to (18), β is used to measure how far the first two
items in (15) deviate from the average value. Thus, tkij > 0
3When k = 1, the posterior belief yirj
′
(1) is an estimated value due to no
knowledge on each candidate.
represents trustworthy voting. The bigger the tkij , the higher
the credibility of the voting. On the contrary, tkij < 0 reveals
an unreliable voting. The smaller the tkij , the worse the voting
credibility.
After calculating tkij and combining with c
k
ij obtained in
the last section, as well as the stake of voter i, i.e., si, we can
obtain the score Skj of each candidate in round k according
to (1). The top K nodes with the highest scores Skj can be
elected as super nodes in round k finally.
Theorem IV.1. The method for evaluating trustworthiness is
incentive compatible.
Proof. As the expectation of tkij , E(tkij) can be calculated as
E[tkij ] =E[αW (yirj(k), ckrj)] + E[(1− α)W (yirj ′(k), ckrj)] + E[β]
=α(1− 1
N
)E[W (yirj(k), c
k
rj)]
+ (1− α)(1− 1
N
)E[W (yirj
′
(k), ckrj)]
− 1
N
N∑
n=1,n6=i
[αW (ynrj(k), c
k
rj) + (1− α)W (ynrj ′(k), ckrj)].
Employing the logarithmic form of W , we have
E[tkij ] = α(1− 1
N
)[p1 ln y
i
rj(k) + (1− p1) ln(1− yirj(k))]
+ (1− α)(1− 1
N
)[p2 ln y
i
rj
′
(k) + (1− p2) ln(1− yirj ′(k))]
− 1
N
N∑
n=1,n6=i
[αW (ynrj(k), c
k
rj) + (1− α)W (ynrj ′(k), ckrj)].
In light of
∂E[tkij ]
∂yirj(k)
= α(1− 1
N
)
p1 − yirj(k)
yirj(k)(1− yirj(k))
= 0,
∂E[tkij ]
∂yirj
′
(k)
= α(1− 1
N
)
p2 − yirj ′(k)
yirj
′
(k)(1− yirj ′(k))
= 0,
we can deduce yirj(k) = p1 and y
i
rj
′
(k) = p2 can satisfy the
above equations, where p1 = P ( ˆcrj = 1), p2 = P ( ˆcrj =
1|ckij = 0) when ckij = 0 and = P ( ˆcrj = 1|ckij = 1) when
ckij = 1. Since
∂E2[tkij ]
∂yirj
2
(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
yirj(k)=p1
= α(1− 1
N
)
yirj(k)(y
i
rj(k)− 1)
yirj
2
(k)(1− yirj2(k))
< 0,
∂E2[tkij ]
∂yirj
′2
(k)
∣∣∣∣∣
yirj
′(k)=p2
= α(1− 1
N
)
yirj
′
(k)(yirj
′
(k)− 1)
yirj
′2
(k)(1− yirj ′
2
(k))
< 0,
yirj(k) = p1 and y
i
rj
′
(k) = p2 can maximize E[tkij ]. Be-
cause p1 and p2 represent respectively the prior and posterior
probabilities that an arbitrary voter i supports candidate j,
reflecting his objective mining capacity. Hence, yirj(k) = p1
and yirj
′
(k) = p2 indicate the subjective beliefs tally with the
objective reality, implying the voter reports the truth in this
case. In another word, only a voter behaves honestly, can she
maximizes her trustworthiness of voting, meaning the method
for evaluating trustworthiness is incentive compatible. When
we use the quadratic form to calculate W , the same conclusion
can be drawn.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the impacts of some key param-
eters on the reward of voters and testify the effectiveness of
our proposed voting consensus mechanism. We conduct a large
number of simulations under different parameter settings, but
only report partial results derived in a few parameter settings
as follows, because other parameter settings present similar
trends and thus we omit them to avoid redundancy.
Basically, we consider there are 50 candidate miners in total
and set the reward of generating a new block as 12.5 which is
in line with the current setting of Bitcoin and will be shared
by all voters of the winning candidate j, i.e.,
∑
iR
k
ij = 12.5.
Also, we assume that voters own different numbers of stakes
indicating their different weights during the voting process,
where any voter i can choose si ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Besides, we
define that all voters can give each candidate up to one vote,
and each voter needs to choose the top K super nodes that
she considers reliable to give one vote.
A. Availability Function
First, in order to study the effect of unavailable probability
on the voter’s merit, we calculate the cumulative reward of
any voter until round t with different availability functions in
Fig. 6, as well as different numbers of stake for the voter.
As shown in Fig. 6(a), we present the cumulative reward of
the voter when her stake varies and the availability function
changes, as well as the case of not considering unavailability
factor, till the round t = 100. While Fig. 6(b) illustrates the
three specific availability functions, i.e., d1, d2, and d3, varying
with unavailable probability uj ∈ [0, 1]. The three types of
functions represent power function, exponential function and
linear function respectively. And the scaling parameter in (3)
is ρ = 5, which satisfies the requirement to guarantee the
stability of virtual queue 4.
In the light of Fig. 6(a), we can observe that with the
increase of the voter’s stake, the cumulative reward increases
correspondingly. Further more, through comparing the cumu-
lative reward in the case of considering the unavailability and
without it, one can find that including the unavailability is
significant to affect the reward of the voter, while when it
comes to the cumulative reward with three different availability
functions, varying the decline speed of availability function
has no obvious effect on the voter’s profit. Also, with the
increasing number of stake, the influence of whether involving
unavailability factor or not becomes more significant, which
can be seen from the increasingly large gap between the results
of considering no unavailability and including it.
B. Evolution of the Reward
Next, we investigate the evolution of the voter’s reward over
time under different numbers of stake and different availability
4Other values that meet the requirements can be implemented in a similar
way.
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Fig. 6: Cumulative reward of the voter with different availability
functions and numbers of stake.
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Fig. 7: Evolution of the voter’s cumulative reward with different
numbers of stake.
functions, where the experimental results are presented in Figs.
7 and 8, respectively.
According to Fig. 7, one can easily observe that the more
stake the voter voting to the winning candidates, the higher
her cumulative reward is, which is consistent with the general
expectation. In detail, the stake of voter i, i.e., si, is used as
the voting weight, which affects her reward obtained from the
winning candidate. Considering the case where the voter votes
the same candidates as super nodes, she can receive reward
from the successfully elected candidates she supported, which
is positively related to her voting weights as the super nodes
divide reward according to the proportion of their supporters’
votes, i.e.,
si×tkij×ckij∑N
k=1 si×tkij×ckkj
=
si×tkij×ckij
Skj
. Thus, the greater
the weight, the more the reward. Besides, because the voter
will never suffer from any economic loss during the voting
process, her total reward is increasing as the number of rounds
increases.
In Fig. 8, we plot the evolution of the voter’s reward with
different unavailability functions d1, d2, and d3. It is clear that
all these three functions make the voter’s reward present the
same evolution trend. That is, the decline rate of availability
function does not have a significant impact on the changing
rate of the voter’s reward. This is in accordance with the
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Fig. 8: Evolution of the voter’s cumulative reward with different
availability functions.
requirement that the difference of availability functions should
not affect whether the candidate can be selected as super nodes
or not, which further determines that the voter’s reward will
not be influenced.
C. Effectiveness of Our Proposed Voting Consensus Algorithm
In this subsection, we investigate the effectiveness of our
proposed voting consensus mechanism through comparing
the voting results without trustworthiness evaluation and the
voting results with trustworthiness evaluation in one round of
voting. The number of super nodes that need to be elected is
set to K = 5 or 21, where the corresponding voting results
are reported in Figs. 9 and 10, respectively. Note that in
the case of K = 5, as only a few candidates with higher
capability to be elected as super nodes are among the first 10
candidates, we report the voting results of them in Fig. 9 for
better presentation even there are 50 candidates in total.
Before conducting the simulation experiment, we rank the
capability of candidate j, i.e., Vj , in the current round accord-
ing to their unavailability probability, successful mining rate
and community rewards so as to obtain the objective ranking
results in the absence of collusion, bribery, inertia and other
negative factors, which are reported in the second column
of TABLE I and that of TABLE II. And the voting results
without trustworthiness evaluation in Figs. 9(a) and 10(a) are
numerically presented in the third column of TABLE I and
that of TABLE II, respectively. Similarly, the voting results
with trustworthiness evaluation shown in Figs. 9(b) and 10(b)
are also reported in the fourth column of TABLE I and that
of TABLE II, respectively.
According to Fig. 9(a), in the case of selecting 5 super
nodes, the malicious candidate No. 4 bribes some voters to
make his total number of votes greater than that of No.
7 in the voting process without trustworthiness evaluation.
While after trustworthiness assessment of each voter based
on our proposed algorithm, it can be seen that the mali-
cious competition behavior of No. 4 has been successfully
suppressed as shown in Fig. 9(b), and the ultimately-elected
super nodes are exactly what we expect as reported in the
fourth column of TABLE I. When K = 21, we assume
that candidates No. 1 to No. 4 bribe voters in this round
of voting. In fact, it is unnecessary for candidate No. 3 to
bribe any voter as he has the highest real capability to be
elected. Through comparing Figs. 10(a) and 10(b), one can
find that the voting results with trustworthiness evaluation
can definitely meet the basic requirement of selecting super
nodes with higher capability; and candidates No. 1, No. 2
and No. 4 are successfully suppressed. The final 21 super
nodes are presented in the fourth column in TABLE II. All
the above experimental results demonstrate that our proposed
mechanism can successfully prohibit malicious competition
behaviors, such as the wrong election and bribery election, in
the voting process. And the underlying reason is that with the
help of trustworthiness evaluation for each voter, our proposed
voting consensus mechanism can frustrate candidates to bribe
and eliminate wrong behaviors of voters.
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Fig. 9: Effectiveness of the voting consensus algorithm when K = 5.
TABLE I: Ranking results when K = 5.
No. of
Super
Nodes
Capability
Ranking
Voting without
Trustworthiness
Evaluation
Voting with
Trustworthiness
Evaluation
1 3 3 3
2 8 8 8
3 2 2 6
4 6 6 2
5 7 4 7
VI. RELATED WORK
Generally speaking, the existing consensus algorithms in
Blockchain can be divided into two categories: proof-based
and voting-based.
In the proof-based consensus algorithms, only when the
nodes execute sufficient proof, can they gain the right to mine
a new block for rewards. PoW [2] and PoS [3] are two classic
proof-based consensus algorithms as mentioned in Section I.
Taking advantage of the traits of PoW and PoS, researchers
proposed several variants, such as the proof of activity (PoA)
[8], the proof of capacity (PoC) [9], and the proof of elapsed
time (PoET) [10], [11].
In PoA [8], a mined block needs to be signed by N miners
to become valid. Thus, the difficulty of mining a block depends
on the fraction of online stakeholders instead of the number
of coins in PoS. Besides, stakes can also be represented by
capacity [9], where miners allocate large capacity in the local
hard drive for mining, indicating their interest in mining the
block. In PoET [10], [11], the leader is elected through a
lottery-based election model, which is required to be run in a
trusted execution environment (TEE). In detail, each validator
takes advantage of TEE to generate a waiting time randomly,
where the one with the shortest waiting time becomes the
leader, ensuring that the leader is fairly selected.
The proof-based consensus algorithms summarized above
suffer from a lot of inherent flaws. PoW wastes too much
electrical energy and is not fair for poor miners who cannot
afford advanced hardware. And with the appearance of pool
mining, more security issues arise or worsen, such as selfish
mining [12], double spending [13], block withholding attack
[14], etc. Because of the latency of new block creation and
confirmation, PoW is unsuitable for real-time payment. Even
though PoS is more efficient and fairer compared to PoW,
it still has to calculate a meaningless nonce value and can
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Fig. 10: Effectiveness of the voting consensus algorithm when K =
21.
TABLE II: Ranking results when K = 21.
No. of
Super
Nodes
Capability
Ranking
Voting without
Trustworthiness
Evaluation
Voting with
Trustworthiness
Evaluation
1 3 3 3
2 23 1 23
3 5 2 5
4 28 4 28
5 9 5 9
6 32 6 32
7 6 9 6
8 44 11 44
9 14 13 14
10 25 14 25
11 38 15 38
12 15 16 15
13 11 23 11
14 40 25 40
15 26 26 26
16 33 27 33
17 29 28 29
18 27 29 27
19 30 30 30
20 16 32 16
21 13 33 13
lead to the situation that the rich get richer. Meanwhile, the
proof-based consensus algorithms are heavily dependent on
dedicated hardware for solving the difficult puzzle or using
TEE in PoET.
In the voting-based consensus algorithms, nodes know the
global information and exchange messages easily so that the
distributed ledger can be appended by not only the miner
but almost all nodes through voting. There are two typical
classes of voting-based consensus, i.e., the practical Byzantine
fault tolerance (PBFT) [15] and DPoS [4]. PBFT [15] is a
consensus algorithm used to solve a classic problem called
Byzantine Generals (BG) problem, by which 3f+1 nodes can
achieve consensus in the presence of up to f malicious nodes.
It is commonly employed in the permissioned blockchain
platform, where the number of nodes is usually limited to 20
as the overhead of messaging increases significantly when the
number of replicas increases [16]. Based on this, many variants
were proposed to improve the consensus performance further.
Raft [17] improves PBFT to allow f malicious nodes in a
network of 2f + 1 nodes for achieving consensus. Tendermint
[18] optimizes PBFT with the reduced number of voting
rounds. The ripple protocol consensus algorithm (RPCA) [19]
used in XRP [20] mitigates the requirement of synchronous
communication through achieving the federated Byzantine
agreement (FBA) in collectively-trusted subnetworks. And
Stellar [21] refines the implementation of FBA in a provably-
safe way. On the other hand, DPoS [4], [22] uses the stake as
a proof for voting rather than getting the chance to mine a new
block in blockchain, which can be regarded as a combination
of voting-based and proof-based consensus.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an uncertainty- and collusion-
proof voting consensus mechanism, which involves the se-
lection pressure-based voting consensus algorithm to deter
wrong elections and adopts an incentive compatible scoring
rule for evaluating the trustworthiness of voting so as to
avoid bribery elections. In addition, we take advantage of the
large deviation theory to theoretically analyze the proposed
voting consensus mechanism, based on which we can draw
the following conclusions: 1) the growth rate of the voting
failure rate can fall off with the increase of the selection valve
more sensitively than with that of the selection pressure; 2)
the effective selection valve decreases logarithmically with
the increase of the voting failure tolerance degree and the
decrease of the selection pressure; 3) the increase of either
the voting failure tolerance degree or the selection valve will
lead to the drop of the effective expectation of merit, which
will remain stable after declining to a certain level. Extensive
simulations verify the effectiveness of the proposed voting
consensus mechanism.
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